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Optimal monetary policy maximizes welfare, given frictions in the economic environ-
ment. Constructing a model with two sets of frictions — the Keynesian friction of costly
price adjustment by imperfectly competitive ﬁrms and the Monetarist friction of costly ex-
change of wealth for goods — we ﬁn do p t i m a lm o n e t a r yp o l i c yi sg o v e r n e db yt w of a m i l i a r
principles.
First, the average level of the nominal interest rate should be suﬃciently low, as sug-
gested by Milton Friedman, that there should be deﬂation on average. Yet, the Keynesian
frictions imply that the optimal nominal interest rate is positive.
Second, as various shocks occur to the real and monetary sectors, the price level should
be largely stabilized, as suggested by Irving Fisher, albeit around a deﬂationary trend
path. (In mo dern l anguage , t here is only small “base dri ft” for t he price level path.)
Since expected inﬂation is roughly constant through time, the nominal interest rate must
therefore vary with the Fisherian determinants of the real interest rate — as there is expected
growth or contraction of real economic activity.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Three distinct intellectual traditions are relevant to the analysis of how op-
timal monetary policy can and should regulate the behavior of the nominal
interest rate, output, and the price level.
The Fisherian view: Early in this century, Irving Fisher [1923,1911]
argued that the business cycle was “largely a dance of the dollar” and called
for stabilization of the price level, which he regarded as the central task of the
monetary authority. Coupled with his analysis of the determination of the
real interest rate [1930] and the nominal interest rate [1896], the Fisherian
prescription implied that the nominal interest rate would ﬂuctuate with those
variations in real activity that occur when the price level is stable.
The Keynesian view: Stressing that the market-generated level of output
could be ineﬃcient, Keynes [1964 (1936)] called for stabilization of real eco-
nomic activity by ﬁscal and monetary authorities. Within theoretical and
quantitative models of macroeconomic activity constructed by Keynes’s fol-
lowers, stabilization policy typically mandated substantial variation in the
nominal interest rate when shocks buﬀeted the economic system, particu-
larly when there were shocks to aggregate demand. While most Keynesians
viewed the price level as responding only gradually to these shocks, it typ-
ically changed over time as policy interventions focused on a real output
target, with little importance attached to the path of the price level.
The Monetarist view: Evaluating monetary policy in a long-run context
with fully ﬂexible prices, Friedman [1969] found that an application of a stan-
dard microeconomic principle of policy analysis long used in public ﬁnance—
that social and private cost should be equated — indicated that the nomi-
nal interest rate should be approximately zero. Using ﬂexible price models
of business ﬂuctuations, later authors pointed out that the same reasoning
also dictated that the nominal interest rate should not vary through time in
response to real and nominal disturbances.
There are clear tensions between these three traditions if real forces pro-
duce expected changes in output growth that aﬀect the real interest rate. If
the price level is constant, then the nominal interest rate must mirror the
real interest rate so that Friedman’s rule must be violated. If the nominal
interest rate is constant, as Friedman’s rule suggests, then there must be ex-
pected inﬂation or deﬂation to accommodate the movement in the real rate
so that Fisher’s prescription cannot be maintained.
We construct a model economy that honors each of these intellectual
1traditions and study the nature of optimal monetary policy. There are Key-
nesian features to the economy: ﬁrms have market power, which means that
output may be ineﬃciently low, and all prices cannot be frictionlessly ad-
justed. However, as in the New Keynesian research on price stickiness that
begins with Taylor [1980], ﬁrms are forward-looking in their price setting, and
this has dramatic implications for the design of optimal monetary policy. In
our economy, there are also costs of converting wealth into consumption.
These costs can be mitigated by the use of money, so that there are social
beneﬁts to low nominal interest rates as in Friedman’s analysis. The behavior
of real and nominal interest rates in our economy is governed by Fisherian
principles.
Following Ramsey [1927], Lucas and Stokey [1983] and Ireland [1996], we
determine the allocation of resources that maximizes welfare (technically, it
maximizes the expected, present discounted value of the utility of a represen-
tative agent) given the resource constraints of the economy and additional
constraints that capture the fact that the resource allocation must be im-
plemented in a decentralized private economy. We assume that there is full
commitment on the part of a social planner for the purpose of determin-
ing these allocations. We ﬁnd that two familiar principles govern monetary
policy in our economy:
The Friedman prescription for deﬂation: The average level of the nominal
interest rate should be suﬃciently low, as suggested by Milton Friedman, that
there should be deﬂation on average. Yet, the Keynesian frictions generally
imply that there should be a positive nominal interest rate.
The Fisherian prescription for eliminating price-level surprises: As shocks
occur to the real and monetary sectors, the price level should be largely sta-
bilized, as suggested by Irving Fisher, albeit around a deﬂationary trend
path. (In modern language, there is only a small “base drift” for the price
level path.) Since expected inﬂation is roughly constant through time, the
nominal interest rate must therefore vary with the Fisherian determinants of
the real interest rate, i.e., as there is expected growth or contraction of real
economic activity.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we outline the
main features of our economic model. In section 3, we identify four distor-
tions present in our economic model, which are summary statistics for how
its behavior can diﬀer from a fully competitive, nonmonetary business cycle
model. In section 4, we describe the nature of the general optimal policy
problem that we solve. In section 5, we discuss optimal monetary policy in
2two special cases, for which analytical results can be derived. First, sup-
pressing price stickiness, we discuss how Friedman’s analysis carries over to
an economy with imperfect competition. Second, we discuss how optimal
policy works in an economy where the distortions associated with money
demand are arbitrarily small. An exact case for price stabilization along
Fisherian lines emerged in a previous application of this kind of setup by
King and Wolman [1999], who studied an environment with monopolistically
competitive ﬁrms and sticky prices, but without the “monetary distortions”
emphasized by Friedman. Our analysis reviews this reference sticky price
case and interprets the prior results along the lines of Adao, Correia and
Teles [2000]. In section 6, we discuss how we choose the parameters of our
model economy.
In section 7, we discuss the results that lead to the ﬁrst principle for
monetary policy. The nominal interest rate should be set at an average level
that implies deﬂation, but it should be positive. We show how this steady-
state rate of deﬂation depends on various structural features of the economy,
including the costs of transacting with credit — which give rise to money
demand — and the degree of price-stickiness. In our benchmark calibration,
credit transactions costs are quite small, and the long run inﬂation ration rate
under optimal policy is only slightly negative, approximately minus nine basis
points of deﬂation per year. Hence, while the case for an average inﬂation
rate of zero developed in King and Wolman [1999] does not apply here, we
ﬁnd only a small quantitative diﬀerence. A smaller degree of market power,
less price stickiness, or a broader deﬁnition of money (lower velocity) all make
for a larger deﬂation under optimal policy.
In section 8, we describe the near-steady state dynamics of the model
under optimal policy. Looking across a battery of speciﬁcations, we ﬁnd that
these dynamics display only minuscule variation in the price level. Thus,
we document that there is a robustness to the Fisherian conclusion in King
and Wolman [1999], which is that the price level should not vary in response
to a range of shocks under optimal policy. In fact, the greatest price level
variation that we ﬁnd involves less than a 1% long-run change in the price
level in response to a productivity shock that brings about a temporary but
large deviation of output from trend, in the sense that the cumulative output
deviation is 20%. Across the range of experiments, output under optimal
policy closely resembles output that would occur if all prices were ﬂexible and
monetary distortions were absent: real activity resembles that in a core “real
business cycle” model which underlies our framework. At the same time,
3we ﬁnd that the real interest rate under the optimal policy does not always
closely mimic that in the underlying RBC framework. To help interpret these
results, we contrast some of them to benchmarks, including a real business
cycle model, our model with simple money growth or interest rate rules,
and a version of our model with the money demand distortions eliminated.
Section 9 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
The macroeconomic model we study is designed to be representative of two
recent strands of macroeconomic research. First, we view money as a means
of economizing on the use of costly credit.1 Second, we use a new Keyne-
sian approach to price dynamics, which views ﬁr m sa si m p e r f e c tc o m p e t i t o r s
facing infrequent opportunities for price adjustment.2 To facilitate the pre-
sentation of these mechanisms, we view the private sector as divided into
three groups of agents. First, there are households that buy ﬁnal consump-
tion goods and supply factors of production. These households also trade in
ﬁnancial markets for assets, including a credit market, and acquire cash bal-
ances which can be exchanged for goods. Second, there are retailers, which
sell ﬁnal consumption goods to households and buy intermediate products
from ﬁrms. Retailers can costlessly adjust prices.3 Third, there are produc-
ers, who create the intermediate products that retailers use to produce ﬁnal
consumption goods. These ﬁrms have market power and face only infrequent
opportunities to adjust prices.
2.1 Households
Households have preferences for consumption and leisure, which are repre-









1As in Prescott [1986], Dotsey and Ireland [1996] and Lacker and Schreft [1996].
2Taylor [1980], Calvo [1983]
3It is possible to eliminate the retail sector, but ﬂeshing it out makes the presentation
of the model easier.
4The momentary utility function u(c,l) is assumed to be increasing in con-
sumption and leisure, strictly concave and diﬀerentiable as needed. House-
holds divide their time allocation — which we normalize to one unit — into
leisure, market work n, and transactions time ht:
nt + lt + ht =1 (2)
Accumulation of wealth: Households begin each period with a portfolio
of claims on the intermediate product ﬁrms, holding a previously determined
share γt−1 of the per capita value of these ﬁrms. This portfolio generates
current nominal dividends of γt−1Zt and has nominal market value γt−1Vt.
They also begin each period with a stock of nominal bonds (Bt−1)l e f to v e r
from last period which have matured and have market value (1+Rt−1)Bt−1.
Finally, they begin each period with nominal debt arising from consumption
purchases last period, in the amount Dt−1. So, their nominal wealth is:
γt−1Vt + γt−1Zt +( 1+Rt−1)Bt−1 − Dt−1 − Tt
where Tt is the amount of a lump sum transfer to or from the government.
With this nominal wealth and current nominal wage income Wtnt,t h e y
may purchase money Mt, buy current period bonds in amount Bt, or buy
more claims on the intermediate product ﬁrms. Thus, they face the constraint
Mt + Bt + γtVt ≥
¡
γt−1Vt + γt−1Zt +( 1+Rt−1)Bt−1 − Dt−1 − Tt
¢
+ Wtnt
We convert this nominal budget constraint into a real one, using a numeraire
Pt. At present this is simply an abstract measure of nominal purchasing
power but we are more speciﬁc later about its economic interpretation. The
real ﬂow budget constraint is











with lower case letters representing real quantities when this does not produce
notational confusion.
Money and transactions: Although households have been described as
purchasing a single aggregate consumption good, we now reinterpret this
involving many individual products — technically, a continuum of products
5on the unit interval — as in many studies following Lucas [1980]. Each of
these products is purchased from a separate retail outlet at a price Pt.E a c h
customer buys a fraction ξt of goods with credit and the remainder with cash.
Hence, the households demand for nominal money satisﬁes
Mt =( 1− ξt)P tct (3)
where Pt is the price which must be paid to a retailer for a unit of consump-
tion. The customer’s nominal debt is
Dt = ξtPtct.
which must be paid next period. If credit is used for a particular good, then





where F (·) is the cumulative distribution function for time costs. As in
Prescott [1987], Dotsey and Ireland [1996] and Lacker and Schreft [1996], we
think of each ﬁnal consumption goods purchase as having a random ﬁxed
cost — perhaps, the extent to which small children are clamoring for candy in
the checkout queue — that is known after the customer decides to purchase
the product, but before the customer has decided on whether to use money
or credit to ﬁnance the purchase. The household uses credit when the cost
is below the critical level given by F −1 (ξt) and uses money when the cost is
higher.
Consumption demand and labor supply: Combining budget constraints,















To characterize the solution to the household’s problem, we consolidate




ct + bt + γtvt −
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6Let λt, which has the economic interpretation as the shadow value of wealth,
represent the multiplier for this constraint at time t.T h eﬁrst-order condi-































bt : λt = βEt
·





γt : vtλt = βEt [λt+1 (vt+1 + zt+1)] (10)
The ﬁrst eﬃciency condition states that the marginal utility of consumption
must be equated to the full cost of consuming. The full cost of consuming
involves a weighted average of the costs of purchasing goods with currency
and credit. The second eﬃciency condition equates the marginal beneﬁto f
raising ξ — decreasing current expenditure on consumption — to its marginal
cost — the sum of current time cost and future repayment.
2.2 Retailers
We assume that retailers create units of the ﬁnal good according to a con-
stant elasticity of substitution aggregator of a continuum of intermediate
products on the unit interval. In general, this will imply that c units of ﬁ-






ε−1,w h e r eε
is a parameter which controls the degree of substitutability. In our setup,
however, there will be groups of ﬁrms which will all charge the same price
for their good within a period, so that they can be aggregated easily. Let
the j-th group have fraction ωj and charge price Pjt. Then the retailer
allocates its demands for intermediates across the J categories, minimizing
[(1 + Rt)
PJ−1






ε−1. Note that the nom-
inal interest factor (1 + Rt) aﬀects the retailer’s expenditures because, as is
further explained below, the retailer must borrow to ﬁnance current produc-







where the unit cost of production — an intermediate goods price level of sorts









This is the price index that we use as numeraire in the analysis above.
Since the retail sector is competitive and all goods are produced according
to the same technology, it follows that the ﬁnal goods price must satisfy:
P t =( 1+Rt)Pt (13)
For each unit of sales, the retail ﬁrm receives revenues in money or credit.
Each of these are cash ﬂows that are eﬀectively in date t+1 dollars. If the
ﬁrm receives money, then it must hold it “over night.” If the ﬁrm takes
credit, then it is paid only at date t+1 with no interest charges.
2.3 Producers
The producers of intermediate products are assumed to be monopolistic com-
petitors and face irregularly timed opportunities for price adjustment. For
this purpose, we use a generalized stochastic price adjustment model due
to Levin [1991], as recently exposited in Dotsey, King and Wolman’s [1999]
analysis of state dependent pricing. In this setup, a ﬁrm which has held
its price ﬁxed for j periods will be permitted to adjust with probability
αj. The model is ﬂexible in that it contains the Taylor [1980] staggered
price adjustment model as one special case (a four quarter model would set
α1 = α2 = α3 =0and α4 =1 ), the Calvo [1983] stochastic adjustment model
as another (this setup makes αj = α for all j), and can be used to match
microeconomic data on price adjustment. In a steady state situation, an
economy with a continuum of ﬁrms will have a distribution with fractions ωj




Each intermediate product x on the unit interval is produced according
to the production function
yt(x)=atnt(x)
8with labor being paid a nominal wage rate of Wt and being ﬂexibly reallocated
across sectors. Nominal marginal cost for all ﬁr m si sa c c o r d i n g l yWt/at.
Firms are assumed to maximize the present discounted value of their real





Pt nt(x)) given the intermediate
product demand described by (11) above and the stochastic structure of
nominal price adjustment.
The model economy is one in which all ﬁrms that are adjusting at date
t w i l lc h o o s et h es a m ep r i c e ,w h i c hw ec a l lP∗
t . This price is determined as
part of the solution to the ﬁrm’s dynamic programming problem
v
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where dt is aggregate demand in period t. Aggregate demand will be made
up of consumption (ct) and exogenous, unproductive government spending
(gt):
dt = ct + gt.
A few comments about the form of the dynamic program are in order.
First, consistent with the discussion of the household, the dynamic program
deﬂates the ﬁrm’s nominal proﬁts by Pt and establishes asset values using
the multiplier λt, which is the household’s shadow value of wealth. Second,
the ﬁrm is constrained by its production function and by its demand curve,
which depends on aggregate consumption and government demand. Third,
the ﬁrm knows that there are two possible situations at date t+1. With
probability α1 it will adjust its price and the current pricing decision will be
irrelevant to its market value (v0
t+1). With probability 1−α1 it will not adjust
its price and the current price will be maintained, resulting in a market value
(v1
t+1), with the superscript j in v
j
t indicating the value of a ﬁrm which is
maintaining its price ﬁxed at the level set at date t − j, i.e., P ∗
t−j.T h u s ,w e









































−ε(ct + gt) (14)
yjt = atnjt. (15)
















which is the requirement that, at the optimum, a small change in price have






























































Pt+j i st h er e a lw a g ea tt i m et+j, j =0 ,...,J−1. Repeated
















i.e., that there is no expected, discounted reward from a slightly higher or
lower price. In this expression, the weights ωj serve as indicators of the
probability of the price being held ﬁxed for at least j periods, which is
ωj/ω0 =( 1− α1)(1 − α2)...(1 − αj).
102.4 The government
The government plays two roles in our economy. First, the government is an
actor in various markets of the economy. Second, the government is a social
planner. We discuss each of these roles in turn.
2.4.1 The government as an actor in goods and other markets
The government in our model economy takes limited ﬁscal actions and vir-
tually unlimited monetary actions.
Fiscal actions: The government demands ﬁnal goods gt in an exogenous,
stochastically varying manner. It levies lump sum taxes to pay for these
goods (the lump sum taxes are a determinant of the term Tt in the household’s
budget constraint above).4 As in many macroeconomic analyses–including
the optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy work of Lucas and Stokey [1983]–
we assume that government purchases have no eﬀect on either the utility of
households or the productivity of ﬁrms, but simply involve a use of resources.
Monetary policy actions: We assume that the government can vary the
money supply Mt in response to the underlying disturbances in the economy.
The changes in Mt could be made through direct transfers to households so
that Tt = Ptgt − (Mt − Mt−1). Given the timing structure of our economy,
in which asset markets are open prior to goods markets, a form of Ricardian
equivalence should hold, so that such direct transfers should be equivalent to
open market operations.
Notice that we do not permit our government to explicitly levy taxes on
or make subsidies to the households or ﬁrms in our economy, despite the
fact that there are good reasons that a government might wish to in our
economy. For example, given the monopoly distortion in our economy, one
use of ﬁscal policy might be to subsidize intermediate goods producers and
levy lump-sum taxes on households to pay for these subsidies. A subsidy
would be viewed as desirable by the residents of the economy because it
could stimulate intermediate goods production, counteracting the eﬀects of
the monopoly power that intermediate goods ﬁrms have.
4By requiring the government to buy ﬁnal, rather than intermediate goods, we are
assuming that there is a common demand elasticity for private and public consumption of
the sticky price goods, if we dropped the intermediate good interpretation.
We are also assuming that the government buys from retailers without using money.
11Notice also that we do not permit our government to pay interest on its
money. Such a policy would typically be desirable as well.
2.4.2 The government as planner
The major focus of the paper is on the government as a planner, in particular
on (i) how it would calculate the constrained optimal policy in our economy;
and (ii) the characteristics of equilibria under the optimal policy. When we
take this perspective, we assume that the government’s objective is to maxi-
mize the expected utility of households, subject to the general equilibrium of
the model. But we carry along the assumptions that the government has a
limited set of instruments, ruling out the use of non-lump sum taxes or sub-
sidies and the payment of interest on money. In this sense, our government is
active as a traditional monetary policy decision-maker, varying the quantity
of money to accomplish macroeconomic objectives. At the same time, it is
passive as a ﬁscal decision-maker. We adopt this strategy because we are
interested in the design of monetary policies that can be implemented with-
out requiring simultaneous ﬁscal actions or changes in the nature of current
monetary instruments.
3 Four distortions
Our macroeconomic model has the property that there are four, readily iden-
tiﬁable routes by which nominal factors can aﬀect real economic activity. We
discuss these four distortions in turn, using general ideas that carry over to
a wider class of macroeconomic models.
Relative price distortions: In any model with asynchronized adjustment
of nominal prices, there are distortions that arise when the price level is not
constant. First, note that the deﬁnition of the perfect price index —which
applies to both consumption and government spending—means that we can
write nominal expenditure as
J X
j=0
ωjPjt[cjt + gjt]=Pt[ct + gt].













Third, since the current model makes output linear in labor input, then we
know that aggregate output yt is simply related to aggregate labor input
nt =
PJ
j=0 ωjnjt so that the above may be combined to yield
ct + gt = δtatnt
The factor δt ≡ Pt/Pt works like a productivity shock in an aggregate pro-
duction function for our basic economy. In fact, this result carries over to the
entire class of setups suggested by Yun [1996], in which ﬁrms have technolo-
gies that imply constant marginal cost and factors can be ﬂexibly reallocated
across sectors.5 Variations in δ can be described in another complementary







If all relative prices are unity, then δ t a k e so nav a l u eo fo n e . I fr e l a t i v e
prices deviate from unity, which is the unconstrained eﬃcient level given the
technology, then δt measures the extent of lost aggregate output which arises
for this reason.
The markup distortion: If all ﬁrms have the same marginal cost functions,
then we can write
Wt = Ψtat
where W is the nominal wage, Ψt is nominal marginal cost and at is the
common marginal product of labor. If we divide by the perfect (intermediate
5For example, if the production function had constant returns to scale labor and capital,
then an analysis along the lines of Yun [1996] indicates that the text equation would be
modiﬁed to ct + gt = δtatf(kt,n t).
13good) price index, then this expression can be stated in real terms as




so that real marginal cost ψt acts like a sales tax shifter in any such setup.
In our model, the marginal product of labor is constant.
Some authors, such as Woodford [1995], King and Wolman [1996] and
Goodfriend and King [1997], have described this second source of distortions
in terms of the average markup µt ≡ Pt/Ψt, which is the reciprocal of real
marginal cost ψt. These authors have stressed that the monetary author-
ity has temporary control over this markup tax because prices are sticky,
enabling it to erode (or enhance) the markups of ﬁrms with preset prices
in response to various disturbances. According to this convention, which we
follow here, a higher value of the markup lowers real marginal cost and works
like a tax on productive activity.
Note that δt and µt (or ψt) are not necessarily related closely together,
so thinking about these from the standpoint of ﬁscal analysis — in which
there can be separate shocks to the level of the production function and its
marginal products — is the relevant background to this analysis, rather than
reasoning from the eﬀects of productivity shocks which traditionally shift
both in RBC analysis.
Ineﬃcient shopping time: The next distortion is sometimes referred to
as “shoe leather costs.” But in our model, it is really “shopping time costs,”
as in McCallum and Goodfriend [1988], since it is in time rather than goods





From the standpoint of our economy, variations in ht work like a shock to
the economy’s time endowment. Pursuing the ﬁscal analogy discussed above,
this is similar to a conscription (lump sum labor tax).
The wedge of monetary ineﬃciency: In transactions-based monetary mod-
els, there is also an eﬀect of monetary policy on the full cost of consumption.
Beginning with the eﬃciency condition (6), using the bond eﬃciency condi-
tion (9) to eliminate the expectations term and substituting out the pricing
of the ﬁnal product using (13), we arrive at a simple version of the eﬃciency
condition for consumption:
D1u(ct,l t)=λt [1 + Rt (1 − ξt)]. (18)
14This equation expresses the wedge of monetary ineﬃciency as the product of
the nominal interest rate and the extent of monetization of exchange (1−ξt).
Pursuing the ﬁscal policy analogy discussed above, it is like a consumption
tax relative to the non-monetary model.
4O p t i m a l p o l i c y
Our analysis of optimal policy is in the tradition of Ramsey [1928] and draws
heavily on the modern literature on optimal policy in dynamic economies
which follows from Lucas and Stokey [1983]. In general, the idea of opti-
mal policy design is for the government to maximize expected utility subject
to the conditions of dynamic equilibrium and the constraints on its instru-
ments. Working in a dynamic competitive equilibrium setting, Lucas and
Stokey showed the power of a multi-stage approach. First, one determines
the conditions that circumscribe competitive equilibrium for arbitrary poli-
cies: in their initial analysis of a real economy subject to ﬁscal shocks, the
relevant conditions that implicitly determined quantities and relative prices
included the eﬃciency conditions of ﬁrms and households as well as the re-
source constraints of the economy plus private and public budget constraints.
Second, these conditions were manipulated to eliminate all tax rates and rel-
ative prices, leaving only a group of constraints on real quantities. Third,
the government maximized expected utility subject to the constraints on real
quantities: this determined a unique path for real quantities. Fourth, rela-
tive prices and tax rates were determined which led these outcomes to be the
result of a dynamic competitive equilibrium.
In this paper, as in King and Wolman [1999], we adopt a similar approach
to an economy that has real and nominal frictions: monopolistic competi-
tion, price stickiness and the costly conversion of wealth into goods that can
be altered by money holding. The outline of our multi-stage approach is as
follows. First, we have already determined the eﬃciency conditions of house-
holds and ﬁrms that restrict dynamic equilibria in our economy, as well as the
various budget and resource constraints. Second, we manipulate these equa-
tions to determine a smaller subset of restrictions that governs real quantities.
However, for various reasons, we ﬁnd it convenient to leave in one relative
price — the multiplier on the households budget constraint— and two nominal
variables—the inﬂation rate and the nominal interest rate—in the subset of
equations. Third, we maximize expected utility subject to these constraints.
15Fourth, we ﬁnd the remaining absolute prices and monetary policy actions
that lead these outcomes to be the result of dynamic equilibrium.6
4.1 Organizing the restrictions on dynamic equilibrium
We begin by combining the household’s ﬁrst-order conditions with retailers’


















where Πt is the gross inﬂation rate:
Πt = Pt/Pt−1.
Next, combining equations (2) and (4) we have a consolidated time constraint
for the household in (22).
nt + lt +
Z F−1(ξt)
0
xdF (x)=1 . (22)
The constraints upon the policymaker that arise directly from the house-
hold or retailers are (19) - (22). Equation (10) is an asset-pricing equation
that determines the real share price, vt, to ensure that the household holds
the market portfolio thereby ensuring that it receives all proﬁts. As such, we
may ignore it in the analysis of optimal policy. Equation (8) will be used to
eliminate the real wage in the ﬁrm’s asset-pricing equation to which we turn
next.
6We do not consider the possibility that optimal policy might involve randomization,
as suggested by Dupor [1999].
16We eliminate nominal price and wage terms from the optimal ﬁrm price-
setting equation. Multiplying (16) by P ∗
t and manipulating the result using

























As discussed above, in any period t, (1 − αj) fraction of ﬁrms that set their
prices j periods ago, j =1 ,...,J−2, will be unable to reset their prices. As
a result, their price in period t, P∗
t−j, is unchanged from their price in the
previous period, P∗
t−(j−1). Equation (14) then implies that the demand for







That is: the past behavior of various real quantities is one way of summarizing
the past nominal prices that are the natural state variables of sticky price
models.
Next, noting nt =
PJ−1














4.2 Posing the optimal policy problem
Two of the implementation conditions, the household’s Euler equation (21)
and the ﬁrm’s price-setting condition (23) introduce expectations of future
17variables into the time t constraint set. Thus the set of feasible policies
for the monetary authority is constrained by the expectations of the private
sector. The unusual nature of these constraints requires us to reformulate
them prior to solving the optimal monetary policy problem. We begin by
introducing Ωt and Φt as the multipliers for (21) and (23), respectively. The

































, subject to the additional con-
straints (19) - (20), (22), (24) - (26) in each period t =0 ,1,...,w i t h
(y0,−1,...,y J−2,−1,c −1,g −1,R −1,a 0,g 0,z 0) given.
This problem is inherently nonstationary. Kydland and Prescott [1980]
began the analysis of how to describe such problems using recursive methods.
Important recent work by Marcet and Marimon [1999] formally develops a
recursive approach to such problems. Following their method, we convert
our dynamic optimization problem into a recursive saddlepoint problem. We
reorganize the terms in (27) involving expectations of future variables at time
0. Grouping expectations of variables sharing the same date, we apply the
law of iterated conditional expectation. Moreover, in reorganizing the con-
straints, we add terms involving variables dated before period 0 to ensure
that the constraints in the ﬁrst J −1 periods are identical to those appearing
in subsequent periods. This requires the introduction of lagged multipli-
ers into the problem. As is well known, these lagged multipliers eﬀectively
convert a nonstationary problem into a stationary or recursive one. The non-
stationarity that would otherwise arise originates through initial conditions
— here predetermined nominal prices — that the monetary authority may ex-
ploit. Augmenting the optimal policy problem with lagged multipliers does
not necessarily eliminate this initial period issue; this depends on the lagged
multipliers’ starting values. However, the introduction of lagged multipliers
as state variables does allow us to analyze a recursive problem.
18The appendix describes how we rearrange (27) and introduce additional
terms that allow us to reformulate the optimal policy problem under com-



























Here St is unchanged from (27) and the constraints are (19) - (20), (22), (24)
- (26) as before. However, we now assume that ¡
y0,−1,...,y J−2,−1,c −1,g −1,R −1,a 0,g 0,z 0,Φ−1,...,Φ−(J−1), Ω−1
¢
is given.
However, if we set Φj =0 , j = −(J − 1),...,−1,a n dΩ−1 =0 ,t h e n
we have not altered the original optimization problem.7 Note that (28) does
not contain constraints on the choice of current variables that involve the
expectations of future quantities or prices.
4.3 Computation
We determine the eﬃciency conditions for the policy maker, given the prob-
lem posed in the previous subsection. We use these conditions in two ways.
First, assuming certainty, we solve for a steady state. Second, we linearize
around the steady state to study the responses to various disturbances.
After we calculate the solution to the optimal policy problem, it is straight-
forward to derive the values of various nominal variables that are relevant to
monetary policy. For example, we can study the behavior of the price level by
exploiting two aspects of the economy. First, given that the optimal policy
problem determines quantities, we can determine the relative price of an ad-
justing ﬁrm, p0t, using the demand behavior of retailers (p0t =( y0t/yt)−1/ε).





are initially set to the long run values for Φt and Ωt.
This allows us to examine optimal monetary policy under commitment while abstracting
from the transitory dynamics that arise during initial periods.
19Second, we can determine the behavior of the price level using the prede-
termined nominal prices, the current relative price p0t,a n dt h ep r i c el e v e l
(12) determined in our analysis of the retailer’s problem. Given that (28)
determines ξt and Rt, we can also calculate the retail price level, the real
quantity of money, and the nominal quantity of money that are associated
with the constrained optimal policy.
5 Optimal policy in two special cases
In two special cases of the model, one can characterize optimal policy analyt-
ically. One of those cases is well known: if prices are ﬂexible it is optimal to
equate the private and social costs of money holding, which means keeping
the net nominal interest rate equal to zero — the Friedman rule. In the sec-
ond special case, the distortions associated with money demand are assumed
to be arbitrarily small. There we can show that under a familiar elasticity
condition on preferences it is optimal for the price level to be constant in
response to productivity shocks.
5.1 Flexible prices
To make prices ﬂexible, set ω0 =1 . This immediately eliminates the relative
price distortions, since every ﬁrm charges the same price. The markup dis-
tortion is still present, but it cannot be aﬀected by the monetary authority:
the markup is constant across time and across states at ε/(ε − 1). The only
distortions that the monetary authority can aﬀect are shopping time and the
wedge of monetary ineﬃciency. Zero nominal interest rates eliminate both of
these distortions, hence zero nominal interest rates represent optimal policy.8
The only novel feature here is that the presence of monopolistic competition
makes the Friedman rule outcome second-best. In a sense, the monetary
authority would like to make the nominal interest rate negative, to oﬀset the
monopoly ineﬃciency. Of course the nominal interest rate cannot be nega-
tive. However, this incentive implies that in the full model with sticky prices,
it may still be optimal to pursue the Friedman rule.
8Cole and Kocherlakota [1998] discuss policies that implement the Friedman rule.
205.2 Absence of monetary distortions
If the time costs of credit are such that the shopping time and monetary
wedge distortions vanish regardless of the level of interest rates, the con-
ditions describing optimal policy simplify dramatically. King and Wolman
[1999] showed that price stability is optimal in the long run for a particular
speciﬁcation of preferences. In fact one can derive a sharper result, for the
case where government spending is absent.
To derive the result, we borrow the analytical approach of Adao, Cor-
reia and Teles [2000]. That is, we impose a constant price level on the
equations describing optimal policy and examine the conditions under which
these equations are satisﬁed. The key implication of a constant price level
across states is that the quantities produced by ﬁrms that set their prices at
diﬀerent times are identical. That is, cj,t = ct and nj,t = nt.T h i si m p l i c a t i o n
allows us to derive the following condition, under which a constant price level
is optimal in response to random variation in at:





















This condition is clearly satisﬁed if preferences are constant elasticity and
separable between consumption and leisure. Note that this is the same con-
dition derived by Adao, Correia and Teles [2000] for a model with all prices
set one period in advance. We have thus shown that the condition extends
to a richer environment, speciﬁcally one with multi-period price-setting.
6C h o i c e o f p a r a m e t e r s
Given the limited amount of existing research on optimal monetary policy
using the approach of this paper, and given the starkness of our model econ-
omy, we have chosen the parameters with two objectives in mind. First,
we want our economy to be as realistic as possible, so we calibrate certain
parameters to match certain features of the U.S. economy as discussed be-
low. Second, we want our economy to be familiar to economists who have
worked with related models of business cycles, ﬁscal policy, money demand,
and sticky prices. Our benchmark parametric model is as follows, with the
time unit taken to be one quarter of a year:
216.1 Preferences
We assume the utility function is logarithmic, with a share parameter chosen
so that a real economy would have individuals working one-ﬁfth of the time.
We assume also that the discount factor is such that the annual interest rate
would be slightly less than four percent. This choice of the discount factor
is governed by data on one year T-bill rates and the GDP deﬂator that we
use in calibrating the distribution of credit costs.
u(c,l)=l n c +3 .3ln(l)
β =0 .9928
We later explore some implications of a higher labor supply elasticity, assum-
ing that u(c,l)=l nc +3 .3l which may be rationalized by indivisible labor
as in Rogerson [1988] and Hansen [1985].
6.2 Monopoly power
We assume that the markup would be 10% over marginal cost if prices were
ﬂexible. Since the gross markup is µ = ε
ε−1,t h i si m p l i e st h a t
ε =1 0
We also explore some implications of a lower elasticity of demand.
6.3 Distribution of price-setters
A key aspect of our economy is the extent of exogenously imposed price
stickiness. We use a distribution suggested by Wolman [2000], which has
the following features. First, it implies that ﬁrms expected a newly set price
to remain in eﬀect for ﬁve quarters. That is: the expected duration of a
price chosen at t,w h i c hi sα11+( 1− α1)α22+( 1− α1)(1 − α2)α33+...
is equal to 5. Second, this estimate is consistent with the recent empirical
work on aggregate price adjustment dynamics by Gali and Gertler [1999]
and Sbordone [1998]. Third, rather than assuming a constant hazard αi = α
as in the Calvo model, our weights involve an increasing hazard, which is
consistent with available empirical evidence and recent work on calibrated
models of state dependent pricing. The particular adjustment probabilities
αi and the associated distribution are:
22Table 1:
Price adjustment probabilities
and the associated distribution weights
α1 α2 α3 α4 α5 α6 α7 α8 α9
0.014 0.056 0.126 0.224 0.350 0.504 0.686 0.897 1
ω0 ω1 ω2 ω3 ω4 ω5 ω6 ω7 ω8
0.198 0.195 0.184 0.161 0.125 0.081 0.040 0.012 0.001
For a given distribution of price adjustment, we can also calculate the
average age of a price which is in place,
PJ−1
j=0 jωj. This average is 2.3 for
the benchmark parameterization.
We explore some implications of assuming much greater price ﬂexibility
below.
6.4 Credit costs and the demand for money:
The behavior of the demand for money in our model depends on the distri-
bution of credit costs. We assume that distribution is a modiﬁed member of
the beta family; the modiﬁcation is that there is a mass point at zero credit
costs. The distribution has four parameters: the two parameters of the stan-
dard beta distribution, which we will call φ1 and φ2, the upper bound of
the support, which we call φ3 ( w ea s s u m et h el o w e rb o u n do ft h es u p p o r ti s
zero), and the mass on zero costs, which we call φ4. To select values for these
parameters, we use data on the GDP-velocity of domestically held currency,
and nominal interest rates on one-year treasury bills.9 It is common in work
on business cycle models with money to view M1 as the relevant monetary
aggregate. In our model, the choice between using money or credit is akin
to that between using currency and a credit card. In addition, M1 has the
drawback of not being controllable by the Federal Reserve under current —
or easily imaginable institutional arrangements.
To calibrate the distribution of credit costs we begin by imposing φ1 =
φ2 =1 , which means assuming a uniform distribution of costs. We then
divide our data sample in half, and compute average velocity and the average
nominal interest rate in the two subsamples. Average velocity and nominal
interest rates in the ﬁr s th a l fo ft h es a m p l ew e r e11.48 and 9.3%, and in
9Our data on domestically held currency was provided by Phillip Jeﬀerson, and is
discussed in Porter and Judson [1996]. The data spans the period 1977:1 to 1995:4.
23the second half of the sample 10.93 and 5.74%. The remaining distributional
parameters are chosen to match these nominal interest rate - velocity pairs;
this procedure yields φ3 =0 .0419 and φ4 =0 .9018. As a robustness check,
we also present results for a calibration that has φ1 = φ2 =2 , which is a
symmetric unimodal distribution.
Some readers may object to our use of home currency data to calibrate
the model. We therefore present results for a calibration that involves again
setting φ1 = φ2 =1 , but uses the GDP-velocity of M1 to pin down the
other two parameters of the credit cost distribution. In this case we have
φ3 =0 .0342 and φ4 =0 .3380.
7 Optimal policy in the long run
The preceding discussion established two reference points for thinking about
optimal policy in the long run. The ﬁrst reference point is Friedman’s [1969]
celebrated conclusion that the nominal interest rate should be suﬃciently
close to zero so that the private and social costs of money-holding coincide.
At this point, the economy minimizes the costs of decentralized exchange.
The second reference point is an average rate of inﬂa t i o no fz e r o ,w h i c hm i n -
imizes relative price distortions in steady state: this is therefore the optimal
long-run rate in the absence of the distortions which Friedman highlighted.
In this section, we document the intuitive conclusion that the long-run inﬂa-
tion rate should be negative — but not as negative as suggested by Friedman’s
analysis — when both sticky price and exchange frictions are present.
In particular, when we solve the optimal policy problem for the bench-
mark model, we ﬁnd that the asymptotic rate of inﬂation — the steady state
under the optimal policy — is negative nine basis points (−.09% at an annual
r a t e ) .G i v e nt h a tw ea s s u m eas t e a d ys t a t er e a li n t e r e s tr a t eo f2.93% percent
(as determined by time preference), the long-run rate of nominal interest is
2.84%. Hence, the long run more closely resembles the zero inﬂation case
than it does the Friedman rule under the benchmark parameter values.
This result raises two sets of questions. First, how do the four distortions
isolated earlier in the paper contribute to this ﬁnding? Second, how do
variations away from the benchmark parameter values aﬀect the optimal
long-run inﬂation rate? Each of these questions is addressed below.
247.1 Behind the benchmark long-run inﬂation rate
In order to look behind the benchmark zero inﬂation steady-state, we think
it is useful to take three steps. First, we consider how the economy would
work in the zero-inﬂation steady state, even if this is not optimal. Second,
we consider reevaluating the optimal policy problem if one or more of our
four distortions is eliminated as a consideration for the monetary authority.
Third, having isolated relative price distortions as a key feature under this
benchmark set of parameter values, we look further into how these distortions
depend on the steady state rate of inﬂation.
7.1.1 The (suboptimal) zero inﬂation steady state
If there is zero inﬂation in the benchmark economy, then it is relatively easy
to determine the levels of the four distortions.
Let us start by considering the eﬀects of sticky prices and imperfect com-
petition: The markup is equal to that which prevails in the static monopoly
problem, µ = ε
ε−1 =1 .10 so that price is ten percent higher than real mar-
ginal cost in the steady-state. There are no relative price distortions —a l l
ﬁrms are charging the same, unchanging price P ∗—s ot h a tδ =1 .I n t h i s
situation, the nominal and real interest rates are each equal to 2.93% per an-
num. The parameters of the credit cost technology imply that 90.6% percent
of transactions are ﬁnanced with credit (ξ = .906) and that the ratio of real
money to consumption is about 9.5 percent.
L e tu sn e x tc o n s i d e rt h ee ﬀects of costly exchange of wealth for goods:
The wedge of monetary ineﬃciency is positive, but relatively small in this
steady state. It is calculated from the above discussion as
(1 + (1 − ξ) ∗ R)=( 1+( 1− .906) ∗ .007) = 1.0007
where the calculation of the wedge uses the quarterly nominal interest rate
.007. From the discussion above, we know that the time cost h is an extremely
small number. At zero inﬂation, time costs associated with use of credit are
approximately two-thousandths of a percent of labor time.
Even though the distortions associated with money demand are small at
zero inﬂation, a monetary authority maximizing steady-state welfare would
nonetheless choose a lower the rate of inﬂation, for the reasons stressed by
Friedman [1969].
257.1.2 Optimal inﬂation with fewer distortions
We now imagine altering the monetary authority’s problem — relative to the
benchmark case — by selectively eliminating one or more distortions. For
some of these modiﬁcations, there is an easy economic interpretation of our
modiﬁed problem. For example, if we assume — as in King and Wolman
[1999] — that there is interest on money at just below the market rate then
there are no money demand distortions (no wedge and no resource costs).
But to track down the origins of the benchmark inﬂation rate, it is sometimes
necessary to consider other more abstract, modiﬁcations. Table 2 shows the
eﬀect of various modiﬁcations of the mix of distortions.10
10The table also presents results of the sensitivity analysis to be discussed below.
26Table 2: Eﬀect of Eliminating Various Distortions on the Long
Run Optimal Inﬂation Rate
(distortion eliminated is marked with an x)11
A B C D E F
mkup h wedge bench ε =4 M1 φ1 = φ2 =2 ∞ l.s. J =3
1 -.094 -.599 -.650 -.088 -.118 -.491
2 x -.002 -.006 -.014 -.001 -.003 -.011
3 x -.092 -.594 -.639 -.087 -.115 -.482
4 x x 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 x -.102 -.754 -.707 -.096 -.131 -.533
Why is disinﬂation desirable? Starting with the zero inﬂation steady
state rate of inﬂation, the table shows that both the wedge of monetary
ineﬃciency and time costs play a role in reducing the inﬂation rate from zero
to the benchmark level of -.09%.
No variation in the wedge of monetary ineﬃciency: Our discussion of
the wedge of monetary ineﬃciency stressed that it captured the full price of
11This footnote explains the rows and columns of Table 2. In row 1, all distortions are
present. In row 2, the wedge of monetary ineﬃciency is eliminated. In row 3, shopping
time costs are eliminated, and in row 4, both forms of monetary distortion are eliminated.
In row 5, the markup is ﬁxed at ε/(ε − 1).
The columns are as follows.
A. Benchmark calibration discussed in section 6.
B. Demand elasticity for the diﬀerentiated products set to 4 instead of 10.
C. The parameters φ3 and φ4 are chosen to be consistent with U.S. data on M1 rather
than currency (see section 6.4). We maintain φ1 = φ2 = 1.
D. We maintain the currency calibration for φ3 and φ4, but set φ1 = φ2 =2 .
E. Instead of preferences that are logarithmic in leisure, we make them linear in leisure,
which implies an inﬁnite labor supply elasticity.
F. We modify the distribution of ﬁrms (ω) from that given in table 1 to ω =
0.4,0.35,0.25. In this case, no ﬁrm goes more than three periods with the same
price.
27converting wealth into ﬁnal goods consumption, so that it was the product of
the intensity of monetary exchange (1−ξ) and the opportunity cost of holding
money R. We now explore the implications of eliminating this wedge for the
optimal rate of inﬂation. Mechanically, we ﬁx the wedge at zero and re-
solve the monetary authority’s optimal policy problem. One rationalization
of this procedure is that there is a consumption subsidy, introduced into the
household’s problem and then varied in a manner that would neutralize the
wedge of monetary ineﬃciency, i.e.,
(1 + (1 − ξt) ∗ Rt)(1 + τ
c
t)=1
Table 2 shows that there is a signiﬁcant inﬂuence of this distortion on the
optimal long-run rate of inﬂation. If it is eliminated by itself, then the
inﬂation rate rises from -.09% to -.002%, so that the wedge accounts for
almost all of the deviation from zero inﬂation.
Resource costs of credit: We can similarly eliminate the resource costs of
credit usage from the optimal policy problem. Above, we used the idea that
the wedge of monetary ineﬃciency is like a tax, so that it could be neutralized
by a countervailing tax. In this case, we must envision a perturbation of the
economy’s resource constraint so that as the inﬂation rate is varied there are
no eﬀects on the economy’s opportunities for work and leisure. That is: we
must view the right-hand side of
lt + nt =1− ht
as invariant the policymaker’s choices. One possible interpretation is that a
ﬁscal authority is adjusting the extent of a lump-sum conﬁscation of time to
accomplish this elimination of resource costs of credit usage.
If we eliminate the resource costs by themselves, then the inﬂation rate
barely rises, from -.094% to -.092%, so that time costs account for almost
none of the deviation from the zero inﬂation position.
Why is there less deﬂa t i o nt h a na tt h eF r i e d m a nR u l e ? If prices
are ﬂexible, then the Friedman rule is optimal even though there is imperfect
competition. In fact, Goodfriend [1997] notes that a positive markup makes
the case stronger in a sense because the additional labor supply induced by
declines in the wedge and time costs yield a social marginal product of labor
which exceeds the real wage.
28To evaluate why there is a benchmark rate of inﬂation of -.09% per annum
— as opposed to a Friedman rule level of -2.93% per annum — it is necessary
to eliminate either the relative price distortion or the markup distortion. We
suppose that the policy maker cannot alter the average markup of ﬁrms but
can inﬂuence all of the other distortions. Why might this be the case? We
have stressed that the markup acts like a sales tax, so one possibility is that










i.e., so that the markup always stays at its zero inﬂation level (the level also
consistent with imperfect competition but no price stickiness).
With the markup distortion ﬁxed, Table 2 shows that there is a slightly
more negative rate of inﬂation. This ﬁnding is consistent with results of
previous studies that documented that the average markup (i) is decreasing
in the inﬂation rate near zero inﬂation; and (ii) does not respond importantly
to variations in the inﬂation rate near zero inﬂation. The ﬁrst ﬁnding of the
previous studies explains why eliminating the distortion makes the optimal
inﬂation rate more negative, since the monetary authority does not encounter
an increasing markup in the modiﬁed problem as it lowers the inﬂation rate
from a starting point of zero. The second ﬁnding explains why the eﬀect is
a small one quantitatively: since the price adjustment decisions of ﬁrms are
forward-looking, the markup is not too aﬀected by the trend rate of inﬂation.
7.1.3 Assessing relative price distortions
Given that relative price distortions play a major role in the determination of
the steady-state inﬂation rate, it is desirable to investigate more closely how
these depend on the extent of price stickiness and other factors. There are
three ingredients of the relationship between δ and the inﬂation rate. First,





















29where the second line involves the use of the steady-state behavior of relative
prices. This equation implicitly determines p0 as a function of Π. Third, the














where the second equality again follows from using the steady-state relative
prices.
T h e s ee x p r e s s i o n sc a nb eu s e dt oa p p r o x i m a t et h es t e a d y - s t a t em e a s u r e










j=0 jωj]2 is a measure of the variance of the “age”
of prices. The quality of this approximation can be evaluated since it is
possible to calculate δ exactly and we have found that it is quite accurate
for inﬂation rates between -1% and 10%, which would correspond to annual
inﬂation rates of -4% to 40%.
This simple expression has a number of intuitive features. First, for small
changes in the inﬂation rate near zero, there is no eﬀect on the measure
of relative price distortions.12 For this reason, it is natural to conjecture
that there will always be deﬂation in a setting that combines sticky prices
and monopolistic competition with the costly conversion of wealth into con-
sumption, although a markup which decreases with inﬂation can provide a
disincentive for deﬂation. Second, distortions are larger if there is greater
disparity between ﬁrms. Third, distortions are larger if there is a larger de-
mand elasticity, that means that the inﬂation-induced changes in relative
prices have a larger eﬀect on the distribution of output across ﬁrms.
The relative price distortion implications of some commonly employed
models of price adjustment due to Taylor [1980] and Calvo [1983] are easily
evaluated using this formula. Each of these models has a single parameter
which determines the distribution of prices by age. For the Taylor model,







2 . For the Calvo model, it is the probability of







∂Π ≈− εv(Π − 1) , which is zero at Π=1
30Further, letting the mean be j it can be shown that the variance measures
take on the values v = 1
3(1 + j)j f o rt h eT a y l o rm o d e la n dv =( 1+j)j
for the Calvo model. Accordingly, if the average age of prices is about 4
quarters, as suggested by the estimates of Gali and Gertler [1999] using the
Calvo model, then v =2 0 . By contrast, a ﬁve quarter Taylor model — which
implies that [
PJ−1
j=0 jωj]=2—w o u l dh a v ev =2 .T h e s et w oc o m m o nm o d e l s
suggest quite diﬀerent costs of disinﬂation at the Friedman rule rate, if this
is assumed, as in the balance of our analysis, to be -4% per annum (-1% per











or 1% of steady-state consumption for the Calvo speciﬁcation. By contrast,
with the ﬁve quarter Taylor structure, the welfare cost is only .1%.
Our benchmark parameterization implies that
PJ−1




j=0 jωj]2 =3 .3, so that the δ lies between the example values
given above: it is .165%. The relative price distortion at the Friedman rule
is thus large (measured in terms of output) compared to the money demand
distortions at zero inﬂation (discussed above). It is not surprising then that
the solution to the optimal policy problem puts inﬂation much closer to
zero than to the Friedman rule (this reasoning is informal, as the monetary
authority balances marginal distortions).
7.2 Sensitivity analysis
We now explore the sensitivity of the steady-state rate of inﬂation to various
structural features of the model. These results are presented in Table 2.
Monopoly power: decreasing the demand elasticity (ε)t o4l e a d st oa
larger deﬂation, 0.60% per year. This is to be expected, given the expression
derived above for the relative price distortion: decreasing ε by a factor of
0.4 generates a corresponding decrease in the relative price distortion at
any inﬂation rate. The money demand distortions become relatively more
important, pushing the optimum closer to the Friedman rule.
Labor supply elasticity:w i t hi n ﬁnite labor supply elasticity, policy moves
just a bit closer to the Friedman rule; steady state has 12 basis points of
deﬂation per year.
31Share of government spending: in our benchmark calibration, there is no
government spending in the steady state. If the share of government spending
is thirty percent, the steady state is closer to zero inﬂation — it involves
deﬂation of 6.7 basis points per year. We conjecture that this occurs because
an increase in government spending reduces the labor supply elasticity in
response to a change in the real wage (our speciﬁcation implies that the leisure
demand elasticity is equal to negative one and the labor supply elasticity is
−l/n times this value; an increase in g raises the level of n and lowers the
level of l, thus lowering this elasticity on both counts).
Concentration of credit cost distribution: we change the parameters of
the distribution function F (x) to φ1 = φ2 =2 , a n dt h e nc a l i b r a t eφ3 and φ4
to match velocity in the two halves of our 1977-1995 sample. This implies
φ3 =0 .0224 and φ4 =0 .9086. With φ1 = φ2 =2 , i n s t e a do fb e i n gu n i f o r m ,
the density has a classic bell shape. There is little eﬀect on the long run
inﬂation rate under optimal policy: it is -8.8 basis points.
Broader monetary aggregate:w e r e t u r n t o φ1 = φ2 =1 , but calibrate
φ3 and φ4 u s i n gd a t ao nM1 instead of domestically held currency. This
results in a signiﬁcant change in the long run inﬂation rate under optimal
policy; it is -65 basis points, compared to -9 basis points for our benchmark
calibration using currency. To understand this diﬀerence, note ﬁrst that for
M1, velocity in the two halves of the sample is 1.748 and 1.650, a larger
percentage diﬀerence than for domestically held currency. For the model
to generate a larger percentage diﬀerence in velocity given the same pair of
nominal interest rates, it must generate a larger diﬀerence in the fraction of
goods purchased with credit between those two nominal interest rates. From
(20), this implies that for the M1 calibration, the additional credit costs
incurred at the higher nominal interest rate exceed those for the currency
calibration. For distributions that do not behave highly nonlinearly outside
the range relevant for our sample, it follows that the sensitivity of credit costs
to the nominal interest rate is higher for the M1 calibration.
Price stickiness: we change the distribution of prices (ω) to [0.4,0.35,0.25].
With this distribution, the expected duration of a newly adjusted price is 2.5
quarters. The inﬂation rate in the long run under optimal policy is −0.49%.
Optimal policy comes closer to the Friedman rule in this case because the
relative price distortions associated with deviations from zero inﬂation are
smaller the more ﬂexible are prices.
328 Dynamics under optimal policy
We now discuss the dynamics of the model under optimal policy, local to
the benchmark steady state described above. Impulse response functions are
presented for shocks to the level of productivity and to government spending
(aggregate demand). We also compare the dynamics under optimal policy
to what occurs under two simple policy rules, and investigate the robustness
of the benchmark dynamics to a change in the distribution of credit costs.
8.1 Responses to two shocks
Figures 1, 2, and 3 illustrate how the economy behaves under optimal pol-
icy in response to persistent shocks (AR(1), with ρ =0 .95) to productivity
and aggregate demand. As a reference point in these ﬁgures, we plot the
behavior of real variables that would occur in a real version of the model —
with ﬂexible prices and no money demand distortions. For both shocks, the
most important aspect of the ﬁgures is that they display negligible move-
ment in the price level. With prices virtually stable, it follows that the real
and nominal interest rates essentially move together. There is, however, an
important qualitative diﬀerence between optimal policy in response to pro-
ductivity shocks and that in response to aggregate demand shocks. While
there is little price level variation in either case, productivity shocks make
the real interest rate behave approximately as in a real business cycle model,
whereas aggregate demand shocks make the real interest rate vary signif-
icantly more in the initial periods than it would in a real business cycle
model. We will therefore discuss the two sets of impulse response functions
in more detail.
8.1.1 Productivity Shocks
In a pure real business cycle model, the response to a productivity shock can
be traced analytically, since the only distortion present is the markup, and
it is constant over time. The real model behaves as































in the real business cycle model. The lines marked ‘RBC’ in Figure 1 corre-
spond to (29) and (30). Under optimal policy, our model with four distortions
behaves almost identically to the RBC model. Recall that in a model with
sticky prices, no money demand distortions and only productivity shocks, for
the preference speciﬁcation we use it is optimal to keep the price level con-
stant (section 5). Here the money demand distortions mean that complete
price level stabilization is suboptimal, but the money demand distortions are
small enough that it remains optimal to approximately stabilize the price
level, and this makes the model behave much like an RBC model. In the
impact period there is a slight deviation from the RBC model. This occurs
because with prices approximately constant, the fall in the real interest rate
(see (30)) implies a fall in the nominal interest rate, which stimulates con-
sumption by driving down the interest rate wedge and hence the full price of
consumption, as shown in (18).
8.1.2 Government Purchases Shocks
In response to a government spending shock, the model under optimal policy
does not behave like the RBC model. Consumption falls signiﬁcantly more —
and labor input rises signiﬁcantly less under optimal policy than in the RBC
model. To understand this behavior, we will focus on the monetary author-
ity’s implementation constraint, which is the eﬃcient pricing rule of monop-
olistically competitive ﬁrms in a sticky price environment. For the reader’s
convenience, we reproduce (23) in a slightly altered form, which arises if we
assume away all monetary distortions and we therefore also assume that the
economy has a zero inﬂation stationary state.13
13These assumptions let us use λ = 1/c and c+g = an to simplify the X functions used























The implementation constraint is then shifted by government spending. Good-
friend and King [2000] consider a simple related model in which prices must
be set in advance, but only for one period, which would result in the related
constraint




For their simpler model, Goodfriend and King argue that the key to under-
standing the eﬀects of government purchases under optimal policy is to un-
derstand that the government will choose consumption, taking into account
its inﬂuence on the contingent claims price λ(ct,l t)=
∂u(ct,lt)
∂ct .I np a r t i c u l a r ,
relative to the benchmark RBC solution, the government will want to have
less consumption when government purchases are high because this makes
the contingent claims value of gt high, making it easier to satisfy monopoly
producers. (As in our calibrated example, GK work with an additively sep-
arable utility function so that the state price depends only on consumption
and not on leisure as well).
Our staggered pricing model’s implementability constraint displays a sim-
ilar incentive, but a dynamic one: the monetary authority wants to de-
press the consumption path somewhat while there are predetermined prices..
(There may also be subtler eﬀe c t so nt h ec o m p o s i t i o no fd e m a n d( yjt/(ct +
gt)), but these turn out to quantitatively negligible). In line with this, Figures
2 and 3 show that the optimal plan involves consumption which is transito-
rily low relative to the RBC solution. Because consumption is expected to
grow toward the RBC path in these periods, the real interest rate is high
relative to the RBC level.
In our setting, then, it is not eﬃcient for the government to stabilize
consumption in the face of government purchase shocks, even though it is
feasible for it to do so. Rather, the optimal policy is to somewhat reinforce
t h en e g a t i v ee ﬀects that g has on consumption, thus attenuating the eﬀects on
employment and output. But, since the implied movements in real marginal
35cost are temporary, they have little consequence for the path of the price
level.
8.2 Optimal policy versus simple alternatives
It is of interest to know how the paths that our model economy takes under
optimal policy compare to what would happen under some simple policy rules
that are commonly employed by macroeconomists. Figures 4-7 illustrate how
the model’s dynamics under optimal policy deviate from what they would be
under a constant money growth rule, suggested by Friedman [1959], and an
interest rate rule of the form suggested by Taylor [1993]. As previously, we
look at the eﬀects of both productivity and government demand shocks. We
c h o o s et h ei n t e r e s tr a t ec o e ﬃcients suggested by Taylor’s analysis applied
to our model economy, speciﬁcally our interest rate rule is (Rt = R∗ +1 .5 ·
(πt − π∗)+0 .5 · ((ln(ct) − ln(c)).14
Aggregate demand shocks: Under a constant money growth rule, as Gali
[1999] has stressed, sticky price models typically predict that some real quan-
tities are predetermined in the short-run, with adjustment occurring only as
prices respond. In our context, with a money demand function that is close
to lnMt − lnPt = κ +l nct, consumption is the real quantity that is rela-
tively unresponsive if money stock is unchanged and the price level is largely
predetermined, as shown in panel A of Figure 4: consumption takes about
4 quarters to fall to the optimal policy solution, which is that it should be
low while government purchases are high. The constant money growth rule
consequently requires that output and labor input respond more elastically
in the short-run to government purchases than under optimal policy, as also
shown in panel A. There are dramatic implication for the real interest rate
shown in panel B: the real interest rate falls by 70 basis points with constant
money growth rather than rising by 60 basis points as under the optimal
policy. However, because the reduction in real consumption demand lowers
the demand for money, there is a temporary rise in the price level under the
constant money growth rule (panel D) and anticipations of these movements
14There is a subtlety here because of the issue of modeling the “output gap.” The
conventional measurement of the output gap is a slowly varying measure, so that we use
stationary consumption in our model economy. However, Goodfriend and King [1997]
argue that the in models such as ours capacity output is the real business cycle solution
in our earlier graphs, so that the output gap would be ct − c∗
t. This change would aﬀect
our results quantitatively, but not qualitatively (see footnote 14).
36imply that the nominal interest rate is relatively unresponsive to the increase
in government purchases (panel C).
Under the interest rate rule, by contrast, there is a smaller diﬀerence be-
tween real quantities: Figure 5 shows that consumption and labor approach
the optimal policy solutions much faster (panel A). At the same time, there
is an initial period in which the Taylor rule produces incomplete accommo-
dation — just as did the constant money supply rule — so that consumption
does fall toward the optimal policy path for several periods. Accordingly, the
real interest rate again falls in response to the shock (about 20 basis points
on impact) rather than rising 60 basis points as under optimal policy.15 The
nominal interest rate rises persistently under the Taylor rule, and this rise is
associated with a similar rise in expected (and actual) inﬂation. The persis-
tent rise in inﬂation translates into important cumulative eﬀects on the price
level (panel D).
Productivity shocks: The same considerations are relevant for understand-
ing dynamic responses to productivity. In ﬁgure 6, panel A, we see that the
dynamic response to the productivity shock under a constant money growth
rule is similar to the responses suggested by Gali. Consumption can rise only
to the extent that prices are ﬂe x i b l e ,s ot h a ti ti n c r e a s e sb ya b o u t. 2 %( i n
contrast to 1% under the optimal policy). Labor input must fall, since the
small output response (with higher productivity) mandates fewer units of
work eﬀort. Again, this diﬀerence in the response of real quantities carries
over to eﬀects on the real interest rate: it initially rises in the face of the
productivity shock, rather than falling, because there is sustained growth in
consumption over the ﬁrst few periods of the response. But, as with the
aggregate demand shock, there are nearly oﬀsetting movements in the price
level which make the nominal interest rate largely invariant to the shock.16
Under the interest rate rule, the monetary authority partly accommodates
the productivity shock so that the real eﬀects discussed above are attenuated
15If we replace steady state consumption with the RBC level of consumption, the Taylor
rule comes closer to replicating optimal policy, while still deviating substantially: the real
interest rate rises ten basis points on impact.
16The path of the nominal interest rate is the path of the real rate plus the path of
the expected inﬂation rate. With with our assumption on utility, the path of the nominal
rate Rt is approximately −Et[logct+1−logct]+Et[logPt+1−logPt] , but constant money
implies that the right-hand side is constant (since logPt +l o gct =l o gMt). This is only
an approximation since there are terms in the marginal rate of substitution that involve
the wedge of monetary ineﬃciency. But it is a satisfactory approximation for our model.
37(see panel A of Figure 7). But the Taylor rule again sets in motion persistent
variations in inﬂation — deﬂationary changes when the productivity shock is
positive — that have important consequences for the nominal interest rate
(Figure 7, panel C) and the price level (Figure 7, panel D).
Combining the results: Taking these responses to demand and productiv-
ity response together, one can say that both the ﬁxed money and Taylor rules
imply less than the optimal degree of accommodation, so that the optimal
policy solution is not reached and there are important eﬀects on the price
level. Typically, the Taylor rule is closer in terms of real responses.
8.3 Sensitivity to distribution of credit costs
In Figures 8 and 9, we investigate how the productivity shock dynamics under
o p t i m a lp o l i c ya r ea ﬀected by two variations in the procedure for calibrating
the distribution of credit costs. First, for Figure 8 we assume the distribution
of credit costs is concentrated about the mean rather than being uniform.
Speciﬁcally, as in section 7 we switch from φ1 = φ2 =1to φ1 = φ2 =2 , and
recalibrate φ3 and φ4 to match the two pairs of velocity and nominal interest
rates. The dynamics under optimal policy are virtually unaﬀected by this
change in parameters. Next, for Figure 9 we set φ1 = φ2 =1 , but calibrate
φ3 and φ4 using M1 rather than currency. The behavior of real quantities
does not vary signiﬁcantly from the benchmark case. While the price level is
much more variable than in the benchmark case, it still moves by less than
one percent in the long run, in response to a shock that has a cumulative
impact on output of roughly twenty percent. Recall from section 7.2 that
this case is one in which the steady state involves deﬂation of 0.65%.
9C o n c l u s i o n
We have developed a model monetary economy that ncludes four distortions
relative to a real, imperfectly competitive model without capital. These
distortions are introduced as a basis for examining the two most widely ad-
vocated views on the appropriate role of monetary policy, targeting either a
zero nominal interest rate or price stability. The ﬁrst two distortions involve
production and encourage the monetary authority toward zero or positive
rates of inﬂation. In our economy, there is imperfect competition and the re-
sultant markup of price over nominal marginal cost leads to production that
38is ineﬃciently low. Moreover, the presence of staggered price adjustment
implies that ﬁrms producing similar goods nonetheless have distinct nomi-
nal prices in the presence of trend inﬂation. This introduces a relative price
distortion that leads to an ineﬃcient mix of goods produced. Into this en-
vironment we introduce money as an alternative means of exchange through
which households may economize on the time costs of using credit to ﬁnance
consumption. The two remaining distortions, both of which encourage the
monetary authority to pursue low nominal rates of interest, arise through the
process of exchange. When nominal interest rates are positive, the absence of
interest paid on money balances leads to ineﬃciently high levels of credit use.
Additionally, the standard wedge of monetary ineﬃciency appears: positive
nominal interest rates increase the full price of consumption.
We examine the role of optimal monetary policy under commitment, using
a parameterized version of our model economy. Many of our parameter values
are familiar ones in the equilibrium business cycle literature. The remainder
are determined by matching some elements of recent U.S. monetary history.
Optimal long run inﬂation rates are close to zero. While the exchange
distortions lead to some trend deﬂation, the production distortions maintain
relatively high nominal interest rates. Examining the response of the optimal
policy economy to productivity shocks and shocks to government spending,
we ﬁnd that the role of optimal monetary policy, to a ﬁrst approximation,
is to stabilize the price level around trend. In this sense, optimal policy
is distinct from some commonly advocated rules, such as constant money
growth or Taylor’s rule.
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43Appendix: Derivation of (28)
This appendix illustrates the derivation of (28) in section 4.2. Beginning
with equation (27), the ﬁr s ts t e pt o w a r dt h i sr e c u r s i v er e f o r m u l a t i o ni n v o l v e s
application of the law of iterated conditional expectations. Abbreviating






















































The second step groups terms involving quantity variables and the house-
hold’s multiplier λt of the same period. This makes immediate the inherent
nonstationarity of the problem which we illustrate by explicitly including sev-




































































































Note that the ﬁrst J − 2 periods involve less terms than all subsequent time
periods making the optimal policy problem non-recursive. However, we in-
troduce the additional multipliers Φ−(J−1),...,Φ−1 and Ω−1 and add, to the
above problem, the following terms.



















where Xj,t = X(λt,y j,t,c t,l t,g t,a t).
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